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CIHM/ICMH 

Microfiche 

Series. 


CIHM/ICMH 
Collection  de 
microfiches. 


Canadian  Institute  for  Historical  Microreproductions  institut  canadien  de  microreproductions  historiques 

1980 


V- 


Technical  Notes  /  Notes  techniques 


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a 

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or  the  symbol  V  (meaning  "END"),  whichever 
app.ies. 


Les  images  suivantes  ont  6t6  reproduites  avec  le 
plus  grand  soin,  compte  tenu  de  la  condition  et 
de  la  nettetd  de  I'exemplaire  film6,  et  en 
conformity  avec  les  conditions  du  contrat  de 
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Archives  of  Canada 

Maps  or  plates  too  large  to  be  entirely  included 
in  one  exposure  are  filmed  beginning  in  the 
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bottom.,  as  many  frames  as  required.  The 
following  diagrams  illustrate  the  method: 


L'exemplaire  film6  fut  reproduit  grdce  d  la 
g6ndrosit6  de  I'dtablissement  prdteur 
suivant  : 

La  bibliothdque  des  Archives 

publiques  du  Canada 

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droite  et  de  haut  en  bas,  en  prenant  le  nombre 
d'images  n^cessaire.  Le  diagramme  suivant 
illustre  la  mdthode  : 


1 

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1 

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:.:■   :.;.N 


E 


■  ■>      .ll^lljijlll     '!•■ 


MA^OR  GENERAL 

n 

Philip  Schuyler, 


AND    THE 


'   BU RGOYNE    CAMPAIGN 


IN  THE  SUMMER 


What  build  «  Nation's  bulwarks  high  and  iLs  fouijdatians  form; 
What  make  it  jnighty  to  defy  the  foes  that  round  it  swarm ; 
Not  Gold  but  only  Men  can  make  a  People  great  and  strong; 
Mp.n,  who  for  Truth  anil  Honor's  sake,  slafid/ast  and  suffer  hmg: 
Bravo  men  who  watch  \<»iile  others  sleep,  who  fight  whilfc  others  By 
'J'hey  plant  a  nation's  pillars  deep  and  lift  them  to  the  skv.   v 


TH^ 


A^  K  N  U  A^  L     A  D  D  B  E:  S  S 


DELIVBHEK 


TUESDAY    EYENlNG,    zd  JANUARY,    1877, 

BBFURB  THE 

New   York    Historical   Society. 
(lEN:  JOHN  WATTS  de  PEYSTER. 


NEW    YORK  : 
HoLT"  Ukcwmers,  Printersj  151  William  Strekt. 

1877. 


RMVnMWM- 


.^h,,mmm^i^ 


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MAJOR  (lENERAL  PHILIP  SCHUYLER. 


AND    THE 


BURGOYNE   CAMPAIGN   IN   THE   STAMMER  OF  1777, 


"  No  lipud  more  <j;e'itle  ever  bowed  o'er  toil ; 

No  neck  more  yielding  bent  to  duty's  yoke. 

No  lure  could  teuii)t  him,  no  seduction  soil, 

Because  bis  heart  went  with  the  word  he  spoke. 

And  (iod  still  nuided  him  ou  manhood's  way  ! 

Well  said,  wise  Shakespeare — '  to  thyself  be  true ; 

And  it  shall  follow,  as  the  night  the  day. 

Thou  cau'st  not  then  be  false  to  any  man  ! ' 

And  thus  in  oneness  with  his  nature's  plan. 

He  wrought  whate'er  his  hand  might  tind  to  do — 

With  all  his  strength,  his  heart,  his  mind,  his  will ! 

God  rest  him  !  may  his  sweet  kxample  still 

Stir,  '.ike  the  air  of  Liberty,  which  waves 

Our  starry  flags,  and  woos  our  soldiers'  graves ! " 


Mk.  Pkksidknt  and  Mkmukrr  of  the  New  York  Historical 
So{;iETY  : — At  the  annunl  meetings  in  Janiiarv,  1875,  and  iiil87<>, 
I  exerted  myself  to  portray  to  you  the  gi'eatest  patriot,  citizen  and 
sohlier  developed  by  tlie  "  Slaveholders'  Rebellion,"  for  the  sal- 
vation of  the  national  integrity.  The  paper  for  this  evening  will 
he  an  erjually  earnest  endeavor  to  present  to  you  the  character  of 
the  pm*es^  patriot,  tlie  most  self-sacrificing  citizen,  and  by  far  the 
ablest  military  commander  l)elonging  to  the  State  of  New  York, 
who  was  brought  to  the  front  bv  the  American  Revolution — tlie 
seven  years'  war — to  ushei-  into  being  and  establish  that  which 
George  II.  Tliomas  did  so  much  to  preserve. 

The  great  man  now  to  be  considered,  was  by  birth  and  descent 
a  real  son  of  the  Kmpire  State,  aiui  his  prescient  sagacity  dis- 
cerned the  very  system  which  gave  it«  pre-eminence.     He  was  a 


true  Ivnickorltockor  iti  the  fullest  setise  of  tlic  vv(»r(1,  Iji-cd  juid 
trained  on  its  liattle-Helds  wliioh  constituted  this  colony,  as  it  has 
been  apj)ro)»riat('ly  styled,  the  '*  Cock-pit  of  America."  Yes,  New 
York  was  to  the  Thirteen  Colonies,  that  which  Jielgimn  or 
Fliinders  or  the  old  Netherlands  had  and  has  been  for  centuries 
in  Kurope,  iJie  l)attle-field  between  France  and  England.  During 
our  end)ryo  condition,  New  York  was  to  France  and  England 
exactly  wluit  Sicily  Ijecaine  in  tiie  projdietic  language  of  Pyrrhus, 
for  Rome  and  for  (Jarthage,  the  truinijig-ground  for  British  and 
French  soldiers  and  geiuM-als,  their  regulars,  proviiutials,  and 
Colonial  militia. 

U\  a  similar  school  to  that  of  Schuvlcr,  and  amouir  numv  of  the 
l)rincipal  actors  on  the  fields  of  1776  and  1777,  Washington  pre- 
pared himself  for  his  extraordinary  station,  aiul  with  such  ex- 
perience, Schuyler  made  himself  the  eminently  useful  man  lie 
turned  out  to  be — suthciently  practical  to  ruin  so  renowned  Ji 
professional  asBurgoyne,  to  whom  all  the  world  imputed  genins. 

He  was  the  second  Major  Cireneral  nominated  by  the  Colonial 
Congress,  second  only  in  f/ntdti  to  Washington,  and  second  to  no 
man  in  the  virtues  which  constitute  one  of  nature's  nol)ility — 
second  in  nothing  that  is  roipusite  to  complete  and  make  up  tin; 
Christian  gentleman. 

To  whom,  of  all  our  continental  nuijor  generals,  excepting 
Washington,  would  such  language  as  this  be  applicable  uidess 
t(t  Major  General  Philip  Schuyler. 

To  those  present,  who  may  not  be  intimately  acquainted  with 
the  history  of  the  American  llevohition,  such  language  may  ap- 
])ear  like  exaggeration.  No  one  will  esteem  it  so  when  he  hears 
the  following  attest  from  the  pen  of  one  of  our  most  truthful, 
judicious,  learned  and  reliable  men — the  venerable  (;hancellor 
James  Kent: 

"Among  the  pati'iots  of  the  American  Kevolution  who  as- 
serted the  rights  of  their  country  in  council,  and  erpudly 
vindicated  its  cause  in  the  field,  the  name  of  Philip  Schuyler 
stands  pre-eminent.  In  acuteness  of  intellect,  profourul  thought, 
indefatigable  activity,  exhaustless  energy,  pure  patriotism,  and 
persevering  and  intrepid  public  efforts,  lu^  had  no  superior." 

Again,  this  distinguished  man  remarked  in  a  discourse  before 
this  very  Society  in  1828:  "If  the  military  life  of  General 
Schuyler  was  inferior  in  brilliancy  to  that  of  some  others  of  his 
countrymen,  none  of  them  ever  surpassed  him  in  iidelity,  activity, 
and   devotedness   to  the   service.     The  characteristic  of   all  hia 


d 


incasuros  was  utility.  They  bore  the  stamp  and  unerring  pre- 
cision of  practical  science.  There  was  notiiing  complicated  in 
his  character.  It  was  cliaste  and  severe  simplicity ;  and,  take 
him  for  all  in  all,  he  was  one  of  the  wisest  and  most  ctHcient  men, 
both  in  military  and  civil  life,  that  the  State  oi-  the  Nation  hai 
produced." 

To  do  justice  to  this  theme  and  to  present  a  proper  l)iograph- 
ical  sketch  of  this  great  and  good  man   would   far  exceed   the 
liii;ited  poi'tion  of  time  which  can  be  allotted  to  any  one  at  this 
Annual  Meeting.     Conse(piently  it  is  advisable,  if  not  absolutely 
nect'ssary  to  confine  the   attention   to  tliat  period  of  his  career 
which,  although  often  written,  has  never  been  presented  so  clearly 
ill  a  condensed  form  as  it  should  have  been  to  enable  his  fell<)w 
citiz'jns  generally  to  know  how  uiuch  he  did  accomplish — hew 
nnu'h  h«'  deserved — how,  v/hen  success  was  about  to  crown  his 
offorrs,  his  laurels  were  partly  tilched  fnmi  him  by  a  vain-glorious, 
but  ('  uming  intriguer  not  "native  here  and  to  tlic  manner  oorn" — 
partly  wrenched  from  him  by  a  body  of  politicians,  like  all  asso- 
ciatioiis  of  political  parties  incapable  of  understanding  a  fraidc 
and  loyal  soldier,  and  of  comprehending  a  disinterested  self-sacri- 
ficing 'uan.     This  intriguer,  Horatio  Gates,  was  perfectly  under- 
stood by  the  true  men  of  the  day,  and   by  his  clearer  headed 
associates  in  arms.     They  saw  through  the  boasting  Englishman, 
who  so  unblushingly  appropriated,  and  who  wore  so  arrogantly 
the  laurds  which  belonged  to  the  son  of  New  York. 

ITow  significant  the  words  of  his  fi-iend,  Charles  Lee,  when 
inriatcd  with  his  ])revious  good  luck.  Gates  set  off  to  assume  the 
(tomiiiiind  in  tlie  Carolinas,  conferred  npon  him  by  Congress, 
without  (.'(msulting  Washington.  "  Beware,"  said  Lee,  "  that 
your  northern  laurels  do  not  change  to  southern  willows." 

It  did  not  recpiire  either  mnch  time  or  opportunity  to  nn-eal 
Gates.  lie  showed  himself  at  his  full  value  at  Camden,  Avhen 
there  was  no  self-forgetting  Schuyler  to  prepare  foi-  him  the  way, 
and  secure  to  him  the  victory. 

From  the  battle-field  to  wliich  he  hastened  without  a  <»;enerars 
])reparati()n,  he  was  swept  away  amidst  the  first  rout.  Well 
might  censure  fall  "very  heavily  on  General  Gates  for  the 
precipitation  and  distance  of  his  i-etreat."  His  first  stop  was  at 
Cbarlotte,  ninety  miles  from  the  scene  of  action,  and  "he  scaniely 
halted  (or  drew  rein)  until  he  reached  Hillsborough,"  one  hun- 
dred and  eighty  miles  from  Camden,  It  is  said  that  "his  hair 
white  as  lie  Hew"  wildly  away  from  the  scene  of  disastrous 


grew 


^. 


defeat  which  he  luul  counted  upon  as  the  stage  of  aissiircd  tnurnpli. 

From  llillftborougli,  lie  wrote  in  the  InnnblcHt  wtyle  to  Wash- 
ington, deprecating  a  severe  judgment  on  the  part  of  tlie  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, ami  appealing  to  the  generositv  of  the  very  man 
whom  he  had  so  wickedly  labored  to  throw  <lown  and  to  supplant. 
Schuyler  was  almost  avcnge«l  through  this  inglorious  Hight.  In 
some  respects  this  disgrace  of  Gates  was  in  strict  accordanc^e  with 
tine  drawn  poeti<*al  justice,  but  nothing  human  <;ould  compensate 
Schuyler  for  the  injuries  Gates  and  his  facti(»n  had  done  him  l)oth 
in  1776  and  1777.  Schuyler  had  already  more  to  forgive  before 
the  summer  (!am})aign  of  '77,  than  most  men  are  willing  to  con- 
done, and  forbeai'ance  ceased  lo  be  a  virtue  when  the  incalculably 
over-esti united  P^nglishman  was  called  to  take  his  place,  in  August 
of  this  year  1777. 

What  feelings  of  self-condennuition  nnist  have  passed  through 
the  mind  of  this  wearer  of  another  man's  anadcm,  when  he 
reflected  upon  how  he  had  vainly  striven  to  play  the  same  part 
in  respect  to  Washington,  that  he  had  succeeded  in  playing 
towards  Schuyler ;  and  that  his  very  success  with  regard  to 
Schuyler  had  revealed  the  truth  in  regard  to  himself,  and  thus 
the  educated  ]*i'esent  tears  from  the  ]>row  of  Gates,  the  wreath  of 
victory  placed  there  by  the  ignorant  J*(ist,  and  restores  it  to  its 
proper  j^osition  upon  tiiat  noble  head,  the  shrine  of  a  sagacity 
which,  in  spite  of  every  obstacle,  laade  possible  the  surreiider  of 
Burgoyne. 

This  statement — all  that  is  said  here  to-night — conies  with 
double  force  and  augmented  emphasis  from  the  lips  of  the 
speaker — a  descendant,  on  every  side,  of  families,  who,  with 
ccjual,  if  not  of  greater  influence  in  the  colony,  were  tlie  political 
opponents  of  Scliu3der,  through  whose  counsels  all  of  them  suf- 
fered, and  at  whose  hands  the  sufferhigs  of  some  of  them  were 
inflicted.  Therefore,  thus  to  exalt  him,  and  thus  to  pronounce  his 
eulogy,  is  a  testimony  of  his  deserving  which  should  carry  M'ith  it 
a  weight  of  conviction  which  might  be  withheld  were  these  the 
utterances  of  a  connection,  an  associate,  a  member  of  the  same 
party,  and  consequently  more  or  less  a  partisan. 

"  riiilip  Schuyler  was  a  pure  and  devoted  patriot,  and  although 
my  enemy  in  his  closing  years,"  is  the  record  of  the  noted  Elka- 
nah  Watson,  written  in  1792,  "I  freely  accord  my  homage  of 
admiration  and  gratitude.'" 

"In  spite  of  personal  difference  and  conflict  of  opinion,  which 
produced  coldness  and  alienation,  the  deep  reverence  of  Mr.  Wat- 
son for  General  Schuyler  was  never  diminished."    In  his  memoirs 


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he  refers  to  liin I  ill  the  foHowiiijj;  liint^uage :  "  Generul  Selmylor 
possessed  the  hijjjhest  onler  of  talents,  ♦  ♦  *  »  jj^  ^^j^g  a 
profound  nifithcniatician,  and  heUl  a  powerful  pen  ;  his  industry 
was  unexampled  ;  liis  business  habits  were  accurate  and  system 
ati(!,  acquired  under  the  discipline  of  (general  liradstreet,  of  the 
BritisJi  army,  who  was  a  distin<;uishcd  fi'iend  of  his  family. 
Having  extensively  travelled  and  mintjjled  with  the  first  (iirdes  of 
society,  he  was  eminently  refined  in  his  sentiments  and  elegant  in 
his  address. 

"Had  Providence  blessed  Piiilip  Schuyler  with  the  cJiuanimity 
of  mind  and  self-contr(»l  which  distinguished  Washington,  he 
would  have  been  his  ecjual  in  all  the  elevated  moral  and  military 
attributes  of  his  character.  America  owed  to  S(!huyler  a  vast 
del)t  of  gratitude  for  his  distinguished  services,  both  in  .the 
Cabinet  and  in  the  Field.         »         *         ♦ 

"To  the  consummate  strategic  skill,  and  the  wise  Fabian  pol- 
icy of  Schuyler,  we  were  indebted  for  the  con(|uest  of  Burgoyne. 
At  the  moment  in  which  he  was  about  to  reap  the  fruits  of  his 
sacrifices  and  labors  he  was  superseded.  When  the  laurels  he  had 
so  well  earnef'  were  almost  within  his  grasp  they  were  cruelly 
wrested  from  Jiun.  He  was  sacrificed  by  a  spirit  of  intrigue  and 
insubordination  in  his  army,  cherished  probably  by  the  mutual 
animosity  which  existed  between  him  and  the  men  of  New  Fug- 
land,  'i'he  idea  generally  prevailed  in  those  states  that  Schuyler 
fostered  a  hereditary  prejudice  against  them,  while  the  stern  and 
arbitrary  measures  which  at  times  marked  his  military  career,  and 
had  probably  been  imbibed  in  the  discipline  of  tlie  British 
army,  did  violence  to  their  sentiments  of  etjuality  and  inde- 
pendence." 

If  the  anecdote  which  Mr.  Watson  relates  to  demonstrate  the 
idea  of  discipline  among  the  New  England  troops  with  whom  he 
came  in  contact,  was  generally,  and  still  prevalent  in  1777,  there 
is  little  woiuler  that  such  as  these  and  a  real  soldier  could  not 
agree.  The  narrator  having  been  l)orn  within  riile  shot  of  the 
'Blarney  Stone  of  New  England,"  Plymouth's  "consecrated 
rock,"  he  can  scarcely  Ix;  (diarged  with  prejudice  against  his 
brethren.  "While  passing  through  the  camp"  (at  Cambridge), 
says  lie,  "  I  overheard  a  dialogue  between  a  captain  of  the  militia 
and  one  of  his  privates,  which  forcibly  illustrated  the  character 
and  condition  of  this  army.  '  Bill,'  said  the  captain,  '  go  an<l 
bring  a  pail  of  water  for  the  mess.'  '  I  shan't,'  was  the  reply  of 
Bill ;  '  if.  is  your  turn  aoir,  Captain,  I  got  the  last.'  " 


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"  Even  tho  elements  of  i^uliordiiiatioii  liad  then  nejireely  l)een 
intnxlueed.  OtHeers  and  men  Imd  rnHlied  to  the  fiehl,  un(h'i-  the 
iirdcnt  impulses  of  a  common  patriotism;  and  the  sekuttions  of 
tho  former  hy  tiio  troops  or  their  a})pointnieiits,  which  first  oc- 
ourred,  were  rather  jiccick-ntal  and  tejuporary,  than  (rontrolh'd 
from  a.iy  re<;;ard  to  superior  position  or  acrquirement.  All  to  a 
^reat  extent  had  occupied  at  home,  a  social  ecpudity,  the  iutluence 
of  whieii  still  remained.  The  distinctions  of  rank,  and  the 
restraints  of  military  discipline  and  etiquette,  were  yet  to  he 
established." 

J'hilip  Schuyler  was  an  honest  man,  an  open,  able,  j^allaut 
foe;  he  did  his  full  duty  by  the  cause  he  espoused,  and  he  never 
received  tho  acknowledgments  due  to  him,  nmch  less  the  rewai'd 
to  which  he  was  entitled.  As  in  the  ruHO  of  (ireorge  II.  Thomas, 
he  was  dead  before  his  countrymen  had  learned  to  know  and  ap- 
preciate him. 

Why?  Because  both  these  illustrious  Americans  were  too  ^rand 
and  too  great  for  the  measuring  (;apacitv  of  little,  of  ordinary 
men.  The  masses  could  not  imderstand  either  Thomas  or  Schuy- 
ler, not  only  from  sheer  inability,  but  beciause  they  were  perver- 
ted and  raisled  by  parties  interested  in  underrating  them.  It 
requires  a  wry  man — not  "  bread  and  butter  ""  men — to  comi)re- 
hend  the  truth,  capacity,  generosity,  and  magnanimity  of  such 
exceptional  specimens  of  humanity  as  Thonuis  and  Schuyler. 

Creasy,  in  his  "Fifteen  Decisive  Battles  of  the  AVorld,"  one 
of  the  best  known  and  one  of  the  most  highly  esteemed  works  in 
our  language  in  this  generation,  considers  the  "Surrender  of  Bnv- 
goyne  "  as  the  thirteenth  of  those  fields  of  decision — "  those  few 
battles,  whose  contrary  event  would  have  essentially  varied  the 
drama  of  the  worhl  in  all  its  subsequent  scenes."  This  is  un- 
doubtedly the  (^ase.  It  was  the  greatest  event  of  tiie  American 
Revolution.  It  was  the  turning  point — the  "  Gettysburg"  of  the 
seven  years'  terrible  struggle. 

There  were  no  foreign  arms  present  to  share  the  glory.  It 
was  purely  an  American  triumph.  No  Frenchman  lixed  a  bay- 
onet or  fired  a  shot.  The  Colonists  did  the  work  for  themselves. 
No  French  sinews  of  war  assisted  ;  no  French  anmiunition  was  in 
the  barrels  of  the  victorious  guns,  or  in  the  cartridge  boxes  of  the 
victors.  No  foreign  talent,  so  greatly  overestimated  in  popular 
histories,  directed,  nor  foreign  gallantry  led  the  men.  Our  peo- 
ple themselves  won  this  success  in  the  field,  and  it,  in  turn,  won 
for  theui  and  for  us  the  French  alliance  and  co-operation.     Had 


E 


wc  Iti'cii  (Icfcjited  }it  iJd'hmiis  Heights,  or  Stillwutor,  or  Froc- 
irmii'rt  Fjiriu,  or  SHrsitoga,  wliiclievcr  ])v.  the  title  soloct(f(l  for  tliv 
tinal  collision,  Fraiuir  would  not  Imvc  (louHidered  t\w  ('olonies  as 
nil  availiddc  \vcai)Oii — a  club  whoi'cwitli  to  av(>ngr  her  \vronp;K 
iij)on  Kiijjliiiid.  l']v('rvtliin<^  af<i()rdt'(l  to  us,  and  done  l»y  iToni.s 
A' VI.  was  snl)M'(iii(jnt.  It  was  tlio  key  to  the  synii»atliios  of  his 
caliinct.  Without  it  then'  wonld  have  hovn  no  American  inde- 
))('M(h'nce.  Nevertheless,  the  hero  who  made  siieh  a  success  pos- 
sihh',  tlie  real  hero,  the  <;reat  man,  8(diuylei',  appeared  at  the 
surrenchM'  as  a  simple  citizen  (h'[)rived  of  his  command — in  dark 
hrown  (ntizen's  clothes,  not  in  imif(»rn> — to  see  t]w  arro<jjant  little 
man,  (lates,  wh(»  supplanted  him,  enjoy  the  honors  of  the  tri- 
Mmj)h  and  harvest  its  reward. 

lint  on  this  sim})le  spectator  in  plain  hahiliments,  the  vyv:^  of 
the  defeated  _<>'eneralH  were  tixed  rather  than  upon  the  one  in  mil- 
itary costume,  to  whom  thoy  had  to  deliver  u]»  their  side-arms. 
If  Burgoyne  could  not  t(?n(kn'  his  sword  to^crhuyler  in  his  modest 
citizen-suit,  and  if  he  could  not  surrender  his  army  to  him  as  to 
his  DoviiiKil  coiKjueror,  he  neverthele^^  conld  still  offer  him  his 
acknowled<i,ements  as  to  his  moral  vancpiisher — victor  chiefest  of 
all  in  magnanimity. 

The  very  s])ot  selected  for  the  Surrender  of  Burgoyne  was  "the 
gn)nnd  where  Schuyler's  house  stood,  and  Gates  and  his  suit(!  met 
the  British  geiu'rals  andthcii-  staffs  not  far  helow  the  smoulderin<^ 
ruins  of  Genei-ai  Schuyler's  mansion,"  and  elej^ant  improvements 
wliich  the  Eng;lish  general  had  caused  to  he  huriu'd,  and.  as  he 
festities,  was  tiieonly  property  tired  by  the  direction  of  iiimself  or 
officers  (luring  the  camj)aign.  Burgoyju'  even  valued  them  at 
£10,000  sterling — sr)0,00() — etpud  to  more;  tlum  three  times  that 
amount  at  the  ])resent  day. 

"One  of  the  first  ])ersons  I  saw,"  said  he,  "after  the  convention 
was  signed,  was  Gen.  Schuyler.  I  expressed  rtiy  regret  at  the 
event  which  had  happened,  mul  the  reasons  (military)  which  had 
occasioned  it, 

"  Von  show  me  great  kindness,"  added  General  Hurgoyne, 
although  I  have  done  vou  much  injurv." 

"  Think  no  more  of  it.  That  was  tiie  fate  of  war;"  replied 
the  noble  and  brave  New  Yorker. 

Afterwards,  in  the  ])reseiice  of  the  assembled  British  Senate, 
Burgoyne  acknowledged  his  sense  of  gratitude  for  Schuyler's 
generous  hospitality  and  chivalrous  courtesy. 

Sucli  In'o-h  souled  (charity  was  indeed  extraordinary. 


8 


The  Baroness  Riedesel,  wife  of  the  geuenil  coinnianding  the 
German  eontingent,  was  affected  ahnost  to  tears  by  Scliuyler's 
re(;eption.  Tlie  kindness  and  tenderness  of  the  "  handsome,"  the 
"  noble  "  man  restored  her  courage  and  his  hospitality  the  strength 
of  herself  and  her  children. 

Now  let  us  turn  from  Schuyler  himself  to  what  he  achieved. 

Pitt's  plan  of  campaign  for  17o9,  whicli  resulted  in  the  cap- 
ture of  Quebec,  and  delivered  the  death-blow  to  French  dominion 
on  this  continent,  was  a  masterpiece.  It  has  been  exceeded  by 
very  few  mentioned  in  history  ;  and  if  each  of  Pitt's  instruments 
had  executed  the  duty  assigned  to  him  with  onl}-  a  portion  of  the 
ability  and  energy  displayed  by  Wolfe,  the  whole  bloody  and 
costly  business  which  dragged  on  into  another  year  would  have 
been  terminated  simultaneously  with  the  battle  on  the  Plains  of 
Abraham. 

Amherst,  starting  from  his  base  in  New  I'ork,  wjis  to  cap- 
ture tlie  French  forts  on  Lake  Cliamplain,  and  to  descend  the 
river  Richelieu  to  the  St.  Lawrence ;  while  Prideaux  and  Sir 
William  Johnson  were  to  drive  the  French  out  of  their  strong- 
liold  of  Niagara,  and  by  Lake  Ontario  and  the  St.  Lawrence 
work  on,  down,  to  Montreal.  Meanwhile,  Wolfe,  sailing  from 
England,  was  to  ascend  the  St.  Lawrence,  and  to  make  himself 
master  of  the  key-point  Quebec. 

As  is  well  known,  Wolfe  was  the  onlv  one  of  the  three  who 
carried  out  his  part  of  the  programme,  and  fell  in  the  arms  of 
victory,  deciding  that  England  shoidd  be  mistress  not  only  of  this 
their  key,  but  of  all  the  Canadas. 

In  1777,  Pitt's  plan  of  '59,  for  the  coiupiestof  the  Canadas,  a 
masterpiece  of  strategical  conception,  was  exactly  reversed.  Bur- 
goyne  was  to  move  southward,  up  Lake  Champluin  ;  St.  Leger, 
eastward,  down  the  Mohawk,  and  Clinton  northward,  up  the 
Hudson.  The  tln-ee  were  to  concentrtite  at  Albany,  sever  the 
middle  and  southern  Colonies  from  New  England,  and  then,  from 
this  central  position,  dividing  tlieir  strength,  prevent  umtual  as- 
sistance and  crush  both  in  succession. 

Von  Bulow,  tlie  greatest  military  critic  who  has  ever  lived, 
the  predecessor  and  superior  of  Jomini,  was  in  this  country 
shortly  after  the  Revolution  (I791-':i),  and  wrote  upon  the  sid)- 
ject  in  1797,  and  in  subsequent  yecirs.  He  gives  the  plan  his 
\nupialified  approbation.  He  is  thoroughly  en(h>rsed  by  a  French 
military  critic,  Lieut.  Colonel  M.  Joly  de  St,  \alier,  who  pub- 
lished his  views  more  recently  in  1803, 


9 


When  he  learned  tliat  General  Burgoyne  moved  on  Lake 
Chaniphiiu  and  occupied  the  post  of  Tic-onderoga,  he  remarked : 
"  I  then  thought  the  English  had  perceived  their  mistake,  and 
tliat  their  army  was  about  to  occupy  the  only  post  which  was 
proper,  and  when  I  learned  the  arrival  of  Burgoyne  at  Ticondero- 
ga,  1  believed  the  Americans  to  be  lost  without  remedy." 

But  the  short  space  of  time  allotted  to  this  address  compels 
the  relincpiishment  of  criticism  and  an  immediate  consideration 
of  the  facts  of  the  sunnner  campaign  of  1777. 

On  the  22nd  May,  General  Schuyler  was  assigned  to  the 
conmiand  of  the  whole  northern  department.  To  the  north,  the 
extreme  important  point  was  Ticonderoga,  95  miles  N.  by  E.  of 
Albany;  to  tlie  west.  Fort  Stanwix,  on  the  site  of  the  present 
city  of  Rome,  109  miles  W.  N.  W.  of  the  State  capital.  He 
roaclied  Albany  from  Philadelphia  on  the  Jkl  June.  Gates,  with 
his  usual  in<lis(;ipline,  refused  '.o  accept  the  subordinate  command 
of  Ticondert)ga. 

"General  Schuyler  founu  that  'nothing  had  been  done  during 
his  al)sence,  to  improve  the  means  of  defense  on  the  frontiers. 
Nothing,  com])aratively  speaking,  to  supply  Ticonderoga  with 
provisions.'  "  He  proceeded  at  once,  with  liis  usual  "  activity, 
fervor  and  enei-gy,"'  to  procure  supplies,  rouse  the  committees  of 
Massachusetts,  Connecticut,  and  New  York  to  the  importance  of 
sending  forward  tlieir  nulitia,  an<l  was  on  his  way  to  reinforce 
St.  Clair  with  about  2,000  men,  when,  on  the  7th  July,  he  re- 
ceived the  intelligence  that  Ticonderoga  was  evacuated." 

].et  us  devote  a  few  moments  to  the  institution  of  a  contrast 
between  tlie  army  which  had  rendezvoused  at  Cumberland  Point, 
on  Lake  Cluunplain,  17th — 20th  June,  and  to  whicli  Ticonderoga 
had  surrendered  by  day-break,  on  the  (>th  July,  and  which  Schuyler 
now  had  to  encounter,  and  this  same  after  it  had  been  depleted 
mor.i  tluHi  one-ludf  by  battles,  privations,  desertions,  labors  and 
diseases  within  the  next  four  months,  when  Gates  appeared :  like- 
wise between  tlie  force  wliich  Schuyler  gathered  up  to  arrest  the 
victorious  Burgoyne,  and  the  gradiudly  aggregated  army  whicli, 
when  ready  to  crush  the  enemy,  he  was  comj)elled  through  envy, 
])rejudice,  enmity,  and  other  ba>?er  passions,  to  turn  over  to  Gates, 
nom'nmlhj  to  exercise  command  and  actually  to  reap  an  unearned 
reward. 

Noin'mnUy  is  not  an  improper  nor  an  unjust  term,  since  even 
with  his  vast  ])repouderance  of  numbers  Gates  would  liave 
acc(jmj)lished  little  or  nothing,  had  it  not  been  foi-  the  superlative 


10 


Intrepidity,  intelligence,  energy  and  ability  of  Arnold,  for  wlioni 
Schuyler  had  applied  in  the  first  instance,  and  the  experienced 
Morgan  with  his  unerring  sharp-shooters,  themselves  in  influen<!e 
and  effect  ecjual  to  a  little  army  in  this  region,  especially  adapted 
to  tlieir  service. 

When  Burgoyne  ascended  Lake  Champlain  to  "  Old  Ty,"  his 
fleet  presented  a  splendid  spectacle,  and  his  army  and  flotilla  were 
su]>plied  with  everything  necessary  to  render  them  as  effective  for 
display  as  efticient  for  service.  History  sounds  like  romance  in 
descril)ing  the  magnificent  spectacle  as  it  moved  over  this  beauti- 
ful sheet  of  water,  in  the  full  brightness  of  one  of  the  cloudless 
summer  days  which  renders  ordinary  scenes  glorious  with  its 
glovving  golden  sunliglit.  Besides  all  the  regular  appliances  for 
the  immediate  campaign,  no  army  of  the  period  was  ever  more 
admirably  e(jui]>ped,  a'nd  in  proportion  to  its  numbers  and  to 
tlieir  expected  service,  its  train  of  artillery  was  complete.  Out 
of  its  eight  or  nine  thousand  combatants,  over  seven  thousand 
were  either  veterans  or  picked  troops,  under  leaders  of  great 
experience.  Its  commander-in-chief  stood  very  hig^i  in  his  pro- 
fession, and  he  had  made  a  brilliant  record  on  the  baidvs  of  tlie 
Tagus  for  dash,  as  well  as  judgment,  under  the  eyes  of  a  master  in 
the  art  of  war,  the  famous  (.ount  Schaumburg-ljippe,  or  Lippe- 
]3uckeburg,  who  had  been  selected  by  Frederic  the  Great,  or  the 
Second  Frederic,  Prince  Fer<linand  of  Brunswick,  to  save  the 
Kingdom  of  Portugal,  on  the  very  verge  of  ruin. 

Although  J^ake  Champlain  had  witnessed  many  military  pa 
geants  in  the  previ(»us  Frencli  wars,  it  had  never  borne  upon  its 
bosom  such  a  one  as  this.  Disciplined  war  was  here  in  all  its 
perfectness  of  nuMi,  material  and  music,  and  the  "sea  of  moun- 
tains "  which  encircle  tliis  inland  sea,  reverberated  with  the 
martial  strains  of  England  and  of  Germany.  To  these  again 
responded  the  l)oat-s<tngs,  reph»te  witli  melody,  of  tlu^  Canadian 
provincnals;  the  whole  a(H;entuated  by  the  wild  l>attle  cries  of 
savage  allies,  decked  in  the  highest  barl>aric  ornament  in  whicli 
these  revel  on  the  war-path. 

In  opposition,  Schuyler  was  not  able  for  weeks  to  colleirt  over 
four  thousand  Continentals  and  militia.  The  latter  were  not 
only  destitute  of  proper  weapons,  but  of  necessary  ecpiipments 
and  of  adequate  clothing.  There  were  not  suflicient  bayonets 
among  them  for  one-third  of  the  nmskets,  and  many  of  the 
patriotic  frontiersmen  who  responded  to  the  despairing  vv\  of  the 
nation's  birth-throes  were  so  illy  clad,  that  in  the  reports  of  the 


11 


day  tlicy  were  justly  (jualified  as  "naked."  This,  too,  at  a  searton 
of  very  umisnal  rain,  in  a  region  of  forest  and  marsh-fog,  wliere 
warm  clothing  is  an  absolute  necessity  for  health  at  night,  even 
in  the  dog  days. 

When  Hushed  with  victory  and  easy  triumph,  with  the  unre- 
sisted occupation  of  a  fortress,  esteemed  ])v  laymen  a  Gibraltar 
to  close  the  rouie  between  Montreal  and  Albany,  the  British 
army  concieutrated  at  Skenesborough,  an<l  had  been  augmented 
by  the  accession  of  hundreds  of  royalists;  by  this  time  Schuy- 
ler's motley  force  had  dwindled  to  two  thousand  seven  Imndred ; 
some  reports  state  it  as  low  as  fifteen  hundred  dispirited  men. 

Three  months  after,  when  Schuyler  by  practical-strategy,  by 
constant  attrition  had  reduced  iiurgoyne's  effective  strength  to 
less  than  live  thousand,  the  persevering  New  Yorker  had  gather- 
ed together  twelve  to  fifteen  thousand,  with  which  Gates  was  to 
ovcrwlielm  the  enemy  at  Saratoga. 

Even  the  New  Kngland  historian,  so  bitter  against  those  whom 
he  does  not  endorse  or  affect,  furnishes  a  paragraph  whose  adnus- 
sions  redeem  nnich  of  his  prejudiced  chapters.     It  reads  as  fol- 
lows :  "  liurgoyne's  campaign  had  proceeded  as  foreshadowed  by 
\Vashini>ton  ;  vet  the  anxious  care  of  Congress  concentred  itself 
there.     On   the  first  of  August,  it  relieved  Schuyler  from  com- 
mand by  an   almost   unanimous  vote,  and   on  the   fourth,  eleven 
states  elected  Gates  his  successor.     Before   he  assumed  the  com- 
numd,    Fort    Stanwix  was   safe  and  the  victory  oi  J>ennington 
achieved;  yet  it  liastened  to  vote  him  all   the  powers  and  all   the 
aid  whicii  Schuyler  in  liis  moods  of  despondeiKry  had  entreated. 
Touched  by  the  ringinjj  ai)peals  of  Washington,  thousamis  of  the 
men   of  Massachusetts,  even  innn  the  counties  of  Middlesex  and 
Essex,  were  in  motion   towards  Saratoga.     Congress,  overriding 
Washington's  advice,  gave  Schuyler's  successor  plenary  power  to 
make  requisitions  for  additional  numlters  of  militia  on  New  York, 
New  Jersey   and   Pennsylvania.     Washingt<tn   had  culled   from 
his  troops  fiv(!  hundred  riflemen,  and  formed  them  under  Morgan- 
into  the  best  corps  of  skirmishers  that  had  ever  been  attached  tf> 
any  army  ;  Congress   directed  them  to  be  sent   innnediately 
assist   Gates   against  the  Indians,    and    Washington    obeyed   ao 
]>romptly,  that  the  order  may  seem  to  have  been  his  own." 

Notwithstanding  Gates  had  such  a  preponderating  tV>rce  in 
hand,  some  10  to  1;{,U0()  men,  ( omparatively  well  organized  and 
e({uipi)ed,with  asnuuiymore  hastening  forward  to  re-enforce  him, 
he  was  evidently  nervous  at  Stillwater  and  as  unwilling  to  engage 


12 


as  was  charged  upon  Sclinylcr,  when  the  hitter  had  only  1 ,500 
troops,  imperfectly  armed  and  found,  at  P'ort  Edward.  Ncverthe- 
lesB,  all  this  time  Gates  was  availinj;  liiniselt"  of  Schuyler's  plans 
without  acknowledgment,  while  consulting  Schuyler's  friends  and 
previous  subordinates,  so  as  to  avoid  the  necessity  of  crediting  any 
advice  or  assistance  to  its  real  suggestor  and  originator.  More- 
over, if  Arnold  had  not  compelled  him  to  tight,  and  had  not 
fought,  and  had  not  thus  precipitated  events,  a  few  days  would 
have  justified  the  remark  of  the  French  observer,  viz  :  "  Tliat 
Burgoyne's  troops  would  eventually  have  been  (obliged  to  beg 
Gates  to  accept  their  surrender,  and  accord  them  the  means  of 
prolonging  life."  Such  was  the  condition  of  affairs  for  which 
Schuyler  had  prepared  before  the  inti'iguing  Gates  arrived  to 
profit  by  the  desperate  sitnation  of  the  enemy. 

Schuyler,  harassed  and  battled,  the  British  full  and  feasting ; 
Gates,  or  rather  his  troops,  fought  them  fasting  or  starving,  both 
as  regards  ammunition  for  their  guns  and  supplies  for  their 
mouths. 

Schuyler  received  intelligence  of  the  evacuation  of  a  position 
impregnable  in  the  opinion  of  the  masses,  either  at  his  home  at 
Saratoga,  or  on  his  way  to  Fort  Edward. 

Could  any  experienced  ofhcer  have  believed  tliat  St.  (-lair 
would  abandon  a  strong-hold  like  Ticonderoga,  almost  without 
firing  a  shot  ?  Far  be  it  from  the  speaker's  intentioii  to  throw 
another  stone  at  this  unfortunatt^  otHcer,  bnt  he  was  indeed,  in 
every  respect  an  nnlucky  man.  John  Adams,  when  he  heard  the 
news,  was  almost  justified  in  saying,  "  We  shall  never  be  able  to 
defend  a  post  until  we  shoot  a  general."  This  hard  rule,  but  an 
effective  one,  would  have  produced  ailmirable  results  if  it  liad 
been  applied  in  the  Union  army,  during  tlie  "Slave-holders 
Rebellion." 

Turenne,  a  master  professor  of  the  ai't  of  war,  said  that  ''in 
military  matters  the  two  most  important  factors  were  time  and 
fortune;  time  was  inestimable,  l>ut  that  adverse  fortune  was 
irresistible  or  invin(;ible."  St.  Clair  was  no  favorite  of  fortune, 
and  his  concluding  scene,  his  crushing  defeat  by  the  Mianiis, 
4th  Nov.,  1791,  fourteen  years  afterwards,  showed  that  he  was 


not    the   man    for 


emergencjes. 


Ticonderojra    ouirlit    to   have 


arrested  Burgoyne,  at  all  events  for  a  time.  Still  there  was  a 
silver  lining  to  the  black  cloud  of  its  abandonment.  Had  tliis 
fortress,  which  had  stopped  more  than  one  English  and  Frencii 
army,  arrested   Burgoyne,  his  line  of  retreat   thence    was   still 


13 


f. 


secure,  whereas  there  was  no  chance  of  escajic  from  Saratoga. 

Pretty  niiieh  the  whole  blame  of  the  loss  of  Ticonderoga  fell 
upon  the  very  man  who  had  predicted  the  insuthciency  of  the 
garrison  and  its  appointments,  and  had  exhausted  himself  in  vain 
appeals  for  the  necessary  reinforcements.  Washington  never 
l)lanied  him,  and  subsequently  he  was  fully  exonerated  by  the 
goverimient  and  by  the  people. 

Burgoyne  next  destroj^ed  the  American  naval  force  upon  Lake 
Champlain,  and  advanced  to  Skenesborougli,  now  Whitehall,  at 
the  head  of  the  lake.  Tims  far  everything  had  been  lovely  with 
him ;  all  had  been  plain  sailing.  Here  he  began  to  encounter  the 
obstacles  prepared  l)y  Schuyler's  engineering. 

One  best  posted  in  the  details  of  American  history,  a  luirsh 
judge,  a  severe  criti(5,  merciless  often,  said  that  already  at  Skenes- 
l)orough,  Burgoyne's  plans  had  all  been  traversed  by  Schuyler's 
preparations,  not  of  troops — these  he  could  not  obtain — l)ut  of 
engineering  work  which  his  mind  could  conceive  as  well  as  com- 
pel the  execution.  While  at  Skenesl)orough  Burgoyne  already 
saw  defeat  rise  up  like  a  spectre  before  him.  He  felt  it.  It  can 
be  discerned  in  his  letters,  in  his  utterances. 

This  assertion,  that,  already  at  Skenesborough,  Burgoyne  felt 
some  strong  premonitions  that  he  had  lost  his  game,  is  almost 
admitted  ^'  /  implication  l>y  Stedman,  and  by  Gordon,  the  most 
reliable  writers  on  the  Revolutionary  War.  On  the  9th  or  10th 
of  July,  the  day  following  the  affair  at  Fort  Anne,  General  Schuy- 
ler played  the  same  trick  upon  his  opponent  that  Frederic  the 
Great  tried  after  Liegnitz,  with  even  more  success,  seventeen  years 
previously,  on  the  Ifith  August,  1760,  on  the  Russian  Chernicheff. 
By  this  means  Frederic  sent  the  Muscovites  wliirling  in  hot  haste 
back  across  tlie  Oder,  and  S(^huyler  so  perplexed  Burgoyne,  that 
the  British  general,  victorious  in  four  engagements,  was  in  doubt 
whether  to  advance  or  to  retreat. 

By  so  doing,  our  Knickorl)o(*ker  leader  proved  that  he  was  not 
deiicient  eitluu-  in  the  stratagem  which  made  Hannibal  so  famous, 
or  in  the  strategy  of  Fahius,  or  in  the  practical-strategy  of  Ber- 
wick, so  greatly  praised  by  the  noted  military  critic.  Decker. 

Schuyler's  every  movement  ami  action  was  consonant  witli  his 
wliole  predetermined  course  of  action. 

The  day  after  Burgoyne  cut  loose  from  Lake  Champlain,  he 
wrote  to  the  Albany  Connnittee  <'  should  it  be  asked  what  line  of 
conduct  I  mean  to  hold  amid  this  variety  of  difficulties  and  dis- 
tress, I    wouhl   answer,  to    dispute    every   inch  of   ground    with 


14 

General  Bur^oyiie,  and  retard  his  descent  into  the  eonntry  ass  long 
as  possible."  lie  kept  his  promise  to  the  letter,  and  he  so 
retarded  General  Jinrgoyne,  that  without  counting  eixteen  days 
which  tlie  latter  lost  at  Skenesborough,  (some  call  it  three  weeks,  but 
must  include  the  delay  a<-  Fort  Anne),  it  took  hin.  eight  weeks 
more  to  overcome  the  distKUce,  forty-one  miles,  which  intervened 
between  that  place  and  Bo'inus  Heights  or  Stillwater,  the  fartliest 
point  soutli  to  which  \n'  ]H'netrated,  about  twenty-live  miles  north 
of  Albany. 

The  trick  alluded  t«»  amounts  to  this :  ISchuvler  took  out 
from  a  canteen,  which  had  a  false  bottom,  a  letter  written  in  the 
interest  of  the  Colonists  to  General  iSullivan  by  one  Mr.  Levins, 
and  substituted  an  answer  intentionally  worded  so  as  to  deceive 
and  perplex  Burgoyne,  and  leave  him  in  doubt  what  course  it  was 
best  for  him  to  follow.  Having  comnumicated  the  contents  to 
several  gentlemen  alxmt  him,  lie  signed  it  ''  Canteen"  and  sent  it 
forward  l)y  a  messenger  upon  whom  the  i<lea  was  carefidly  im- 
pressed that  he  was  to  allow  himself  to  be  captured.  The  bearer 
was  taken  prisoner,  and  the  connmmication  coniided  to  him  soon 
came  into  Burgoyne's  hands.  This  had  all  the  effect  which 
Schuyler  could  have  desired.  Bm'goyne  was  so  completely  duped 
and  puzzled  hy  it  foi*  several  days  that  he  was  at  a  loss  wliether 
to  advance  or  retreat.  This  acknowledgment,  so  flattering  to 
our  Knickerbocker  general's  sagacity,  was  absolutely  confessed 
to  one  of  Schuyler's  staff  after  the  surrender,  and  this  gentleman 
Avas  asked  whether  he  knew  anything  about  the  intercepted  k'ttcr, 
l)Ut  no  satisfaction  was  given  to  or  obtained  l»y  the  British  com- 
mander. 

Now,  if  a  general  who  has  come  four  thousand  miles  toinvade, 
advaiu-.e  and  tight,  after  an  initiative  of  ten  days,  a  conquest  and 
two  victories,  is  in  doubt,  already,  whethei*  to  advance  or  retreat, 
this  general  is  in  a  condition  ecpiivalent  to  feeling  himself  nu)rally 
whipped,  an<l  Burgoyne  was  already  "Burgoyned"  over  a  nu)nth 
l»eforc  Gates  even  put  in  an  appearance.  At  all  events  he  knew 
it,  siirehj,  before  Gates  assumed  commaiul,  for  he  had  the  news 
of  Hoosick  or  Sancoick,  misnaujed  Bennington,  on  the  17th 
August. 

Neither  time,  opportunity  nor  intention  permits  any  detailed 
consideration  of  the  actual  lighting  or  engagements  which 
occurred.  Nevertheless,  it  is  utterly  impossible  to  pass  over 
without  conunent  what  are  termed  the  battles  of  Hubl>ardton,  on 
the  7th  July,  and  Fort  Anne,  on  the  8th.     In  both  of  these,  as  fur 


IK 


Hi*  moral  oi^eot  was  roiicoriiod,  tlio  Americ^ans  Wero,  to  a  lar»>;o 
extent,  siutceHsful. 

The  Earl  of  J^alcarraa,  who  commanded  the  British  liij;ht 
infantry,  testified  before  the  Burgoyne  Court  of  In(|niry,  that 
"  circnmstanced  as  the  enemy  (that  is,  tlie  Americans),  was;  as  an 
army  very  hard  pi'cssed  in  their  retreat,  tliey  certainly  l)eha\eB 
with  iirreat  gallantry."  Tie  added,  si<!;nificantly,  that  "  pm-snit  was 
not  ])racticable."  Bear  in  mind  that  the  British  force  in  tliis 
action  was  a  picked  brigade,  under  Bnrgoyno's  best  lientemmt, 
Fraser,  whose  death,  subsequently,  may  almost  be  said  to  have 
terminated  the  British  hard  fighting. 

Tiie  Earl  of  Harrington  bore  witness :  "  They  (the  Americans) 
behaved  in  the  beginning  of  the  action  with  a  good  deal  of 
spirit,  l)ut  on  tlie  British  troops  rushing  on  them  with  their  bayo- 
nets, they  gave  way  in  great  confusion."  He  also  added,  "  It 
certainly  was  not  practicable  to  pursue  the  enemy  further  tlian 
th(»y  wei'e  pui'sued  on  that  occasion.  I  think  we  ran  some  risk 
even  in  pursuing  them  so  far." 

This  language  is  the  more  remarkable  and  credifalde  to  the 
Americans,  l)ecause  it  could  s(!arcely  be  expected  for  green  troops, 
us  <(.  rule  vy'ithovt  hayi>iiets^  to  stand  their  ground  against  regulars 
well  provided  with  this  weapon  of  close  condjat  and  practi(;ed  in 
its  use.  Moreover,  the  cartridge  boxes,  as  well  as  the  stoma(!hs 
of  our  people  were  empty  ;  in  other  words,  their  nmskets  were 
no  better  tlian  clubs  in  weak  hands.  Finally,  at  the  critical 
moment,  (leneral  Riedesel  arrived  witli  his  Brunswickers'  singing 
tlieir  enthusiastic  battle-songs,  to  Hank  tlK^  almost  exhausted 
Americans,  who  were  set  down,  even  by  the  British,  at  not  more 
than  two  thousand  men.  Fraser  had  at  least  eight  hundred  and 
fifty  picked  men,  and  Reidesel  likewise  brought  up  tlie  I'lite  of 
Ids  Gernuuis.       So  much  for  Hubbardton. 

In  regard  to  Fort  Anne,  Deputy  Quartermaster-Genei-al 
Monev  savs  that  tlie  Americans'  fire  was  heavier  at  Fort  Amu' 
than  on  any  other  occasion  during  the  campaign,  except  in  the 
action  of  the  19th  Septend)er  (known  as  the  1st  Stillwater),  that 
they  continued  a  vigorous  attack  on  a  very  strong  position  for 
upwards  of  two  hours,  and  would  have  carried  it  had  it  not  l)een 
for  the  Indians. 

Major  Forbes  testified  that  the  Americans  would  have  "forced" 
the  British  had  it  not  been  for  the  arrival  of  Indians,  whose 
fearful  "  whoops "  induced  the  Americans  to  believe  that  they 
were  surrounded  l)y  savages. 


16 

Lieutenant  (yolonel  Hill,  who  conunanded  the  Britisli  9th  Iteg- 
inient,  had  five  hundred  and  fortv-two  veteranw,  and  occupied  a 
strong  position.  He  certainly  did  not  retain  possession  of  the 
battle-ti  Id,  despite  the  arrival  of  the  Indians,  and  the  knowledge 
that  Major  General  Phillips  with  the  iiOth  Regiment,  five  hundred 
and  twenty-eight  men,  and  two  pieces  of  artilhsry,  was  pressing 
forward  to  his  assistance. 

It  is  somewhat  curious,  that,  at  h'>  rt  Anne,  the  English  aban- 
doned a  wounded  officer  of  great  merit,  likewise  a  surgeon  and 
other  prisoners,  when,  to  use  theii*  language,  they  "  changed 
grouiul."     This  scan^ely  reads  like  a  victory. 

It  is  a  great  fashion  to  decry  popular  levies  for  not  engaging 
regular  troops  when  the  latter  are  perfectly  well  armed,  and  the 
former mostinadequately.  Asarule (and agreatirumy distinguished 
generals  have  horiu'  witness  to  tlie  fact),  young  ti'oops  tight  bet- 
ter than  old  troops  on  the  aggressive  when  they  are  new  to  lire 
and  its  perils. 

Diu-ing  the  Hurgoyne  campaign,  charges  have  been  reiterated 
ngainst  our  men,  of  want  of  gallantry.  It  is  only  necessary  to 
ap])eal  t(»  the  enemy  for  their  vindication.  When  the  Earl  of 
Balcarras  was  asked  if  the  Americans  abandoned  their  works  on 
account  of  their  fear  of  the  British  artillery,  he  answered,  "  The 
reason  they  did  not  defend  their  entrenchments  was,  that  they 
always  marched  out  of  them,  and  attacked  us^ 

Let  us  now  resume  the  direct  consideration  of  Burgoyne's  sit- 
uation, in  order  to  discover  why  lie  lingered  so  long  at  Skenes- 
borough.  His  orders  at  that  point  are  dated  7th  until  23d  July. 
On  the  2r)th,  he  had  only  accomplished  13  to  13  miles  and  reached 
Fort  Anne,  where  he  remained  until  the  28th.  On  the  29th  he 
was  at  Pitch-pine  Plains,  just  south  of  it,  and  on  the  30th,  at 
Fort  p]dward,  where  he  remained  until  the  13th  August.  In  other 
words,  he  had  only  gained  about  f^venty-five  miles  in  advaiure  in 
tliirty-eight  days. 

At  Skenesborough  he  recognized  that  he  had  in  front  of  him 
a  comparative  wilderness  of  about  twenty -five  miles,  travei'sed  by 
few  wood-roads  or  tracks  and  bridle-paths.  These  were  almost 
impassible  in  such  an  exceptionally  wet  season  as  the  summer  of 
1777,  and  moreover  led  through  dense  forests  whicli  Schuyler 
had  converted  into  vast  abatis.  Hundreds  of  sturdy  woodsmen,  if 
they  could  not  stand  up  in  arms  before  regulars  and  shoot  them 
down  in  line  of  battle,  could  fell  trees  by  thousands.  To  quote  the 
bnguage  of    a  contem]>orary,  "  Sclmyler  converted   these  woods 


) 


17 


!■  1» 


into  ondlcHB  Hlusliitigs,  impeiujtrable  with  their  iiittM-laced  brunch- 
68."  IIo  likewiso  not  only  so  completely  obstnicted  the  Wood- 
creek,  which  flows  by  Fort  Anne  northward  into  Lake  Champlain, 
by  i()llin<>;  iuiniense  rocks  into  its  channel,  that  he  thereby  ren- 
<lered  it  extremely  ditticidt  for  Hurgoyne  to  supply  the  daily 
wants  of  his  army,  but  he  caused  the  very  same  to  be  done  by  the 
other  Wood-creek,  which  em])ties  into  Oneida  Lake  and  consti- 
tuted the  channel  of  eommuni(!ation  for  the  British  troops 
operating  before  Fort  Stanwix.  St.  Leger,  in  his  report,  states 
that  it  took  one  hundred  and  iifty  woodsmen  foiu'teen  days  t(» 
open  the  latter  before  he  could  get  his  batteaux  up  with  supplies. 

The  non-military  listener  may  ask,  what  does  all  this  amount 
to?  Everything  in  war.  That  the  commissariat  is  as  important 
to  an  army  as  all  the  othei"  administrative  branches  combined,  is 
fully  set  f(jrth  in  the  military  treatises  of  all  ages.  This  military 
trutli  is  to  be  found  in  the  Ohl  Testament,  and  logistics,  especially 
in  a  new  country,  is  more  important  than  strategy  and  tactics.  The 
employment  of  means  rather  than  men,  constitutes  the  pith  of 
practical-strategy,  and  practical-strategy  has  saved  more  coun- 
tries than  lighting. 

Frederic  the  Great  was  a  practical  commander  if  ever  one 
existed,  and  he  said  that  "  to  get  a  body  of  troops  in  condition 
for  effective  service,  it  was  necessary  to  begin  with  the  stomach," 
and  added  thereto,  that  "  an  army  like  a  serpent  goes  on  its  belly." 

Schuyler  impressed  upon  Burgoyne  the  full  force  of  this  lesson 
from  the  very  first,  and  he  made  the  valley  of  the  Hudson  like 
Jordan,  a  hard  road  for  the  British  to  travel.  It  is  conceded  by 
every  writer,  that  Burgoyne  did  not  sometimes  accomplish  more 
than  a  mile  in  twenty -four  hours,  and,  in  exigencies,  did  not  get 
over  three  to  four  miles  a  day.  No  wonder  that  an  anonymous 
writer  upon  the  Revolution  exclaimed :  "  It  was  fortunate  for 
General  Gates  that  the  retreat  from  Ticonderoga  had  been  con- 
ducted under  other  auspices  than  his,  and  that  he  took  the  com- 
mand when  the  indefatigable,  but  unrecpiited  labors  of  Schuyler, 
and  the  courage  of  Stark  and  his  mountaineers  had  already 
insured  the  ultimate  defeat  of  Burgoyne!" 

Warren  once  made  the  remark  that  time  in  war  was  often  so 
precious  that  delay  at  crises  would  be  cheaply  purchased  at  any 
expenditure  of  human  life.  At  this  time  he  was  estimating  the 
value  of  the  morning  hours  gained  on  the  first  day  of  Gettysburg 
at  such  a  tremendous  cost  of  life,  which,  nevertheless,  was  cheap, 
inasmu(!li  as  it  saved  the  position  and  enabled  the  army  to  concen- 
trate and  establish  itself. 


18 


Otlicr  i:;(Mi('rals  to  wlioiii  tliiK  opinion  wiiBsiildiiitfcd  (Mdisidfrrd 
it  r(MnJirkiil>l_v  soimd.  Apply  tliin  ruK-  of  jndjrjiKMit  to  Sclmvlcr, 
iiiid  tlioii,  find  only  then,  can  the  offcct  f»f  his  stTviccs  ho 
iipprc'ciatcd.  The  delnv  he  iiu])oHed  upon  liurgoyne  wiiis  equiva- 
lent to  more  than  one  bloody  vietoi-y. 

Marcelluh,  the  "  Sword  of  Home,"  never  gained  an  nuthenti- 
eated  HuceesH  over  Hannibal,  whereas  Fabius,  the  •'Delayer"  or 
"  Shield,"  not  only  nearly  I'uined  the  greatent  military  loader  the 
world  has  ever  known,  but  eventually  saved  his  country. 

Scihuyler  was  a  eonsunnnate  practi(^al-strate<^ist,  an<l  he  saved 
the  Colonies,  just  as  de  la  Lippe  saved  Portuj^al  in  1700.  The 
latter  with  few  and  poor  troops  could  not  face  the  Spaniards, 
superior  in  discipline,  preparation  ajid  nund)ers,  but  Ik*  worried 
them  out,  and  impeded  them  until  he  was  ready  to  strike,  and 
then  he  struck,  and  they  were  compelled  \o  evacuate  Portugal. 
The  same  was  exactly  the  case  with  Schuyler,  lie  knew  that 
Hurgoyne  could  not  advance  without  provisions.  Accordingly  he 
stripped  the  country  before  him  of  evervthin<^  which  (rould  nour- 
ish his  army,  and  he  determined  that  he  should  carry  as  little  with 
him  as  possible,  and  that  little  amid  extreme  difficulties  such  as 
never  had  entered  into  bis  calcuhitions. 

A  few  years  ago  a  beautiful  picture  was  exhibited  in  the 
National  Academy  of  Design,  representing  Mrs.  General  Schuy- 
ler setting  fir^  to  her  husband's  golden  fields  of  ripened  grain. 
Thus  by  the  destruction  of  his  own  crops,  lie  set  an  example 
which  thenceforward  no  one  could  refuse  to  follow.  Thus  when 
the  (;ereals  were  reduced  to  ashes,  ami  the  live  stock  driven  off, 
Jiurgoyne,  as  he  sadly  remarked,  had  to  look  back  even  acM'oss  the 
sea  to  Trelnnd  for  the  daily  nourishment  of  his  soldiei's.  The 
food  thus  brought  in  ships,  river-craft,  and  wheel-carriages,  after 
a  transit  of  nearly  four  thousand  miles,  was  effectually  stopped 
and  neutralized  by  the  barrierof  desolation  prepared  by  Schuyler. 
Provisions  were  already  short  by  the  9th,  lotlf  July,  before  the 
P)ritish  got  twelve  miles  from  their  water-base. 

Take  a  contemporaneous  nuip  of  this  portion  of  the  State  of 
New  York,  and  the  case  will  l)econie  apparent  at  a  glance. 
Having  rendered  land  carriage  almost  impracti(*able  with  his 
slashings  and  destruction  of  the  bridges,  and  water-transport 
almost  equally  impossible  by  efforts  of  engineering  labor,  it  is  not 
surprising  that  Burgoyne,  ali'eady,  on  the  7th  of  July,  and  at 
Skenesborough,  was  appalled  by  the  difficulties  before  hiu).  He 
was  S(»  perplexed  at  one  time,  that  he  thought  of  going  back  and 


)■  . 


■J 


19 


^   1 


t    :   \ 


taking  the  route  of  Lake  Gforj^t',  ori<;iiially  bU^gcstr<l  by  liifi 
kiiijjr.  Tlu;  inrmt  iiiimicral  critic  will  admit  that  Scliuvler  had  (h)no 
well,  coiisiderinij  the  original  force  at  lilis  diispositioii. 

Moreover,  the  Kiit;li.sh  otHcers  a(hiiit  that  the  Americans  won* 
iiKUdatijfahU'  in  seciiriiij;  tliemKelves  i»y  ( ntreiichmeiits,  and  as  a 
rule  added  an  al>atis  to  their  field-works.  This  shows  that  thev 
had  some  one  at  their  head  who  knew  as  nnich  in  the  l)e<j;inninp,' 
as  our  best  <;;enerals  and  officers  came  to  learn  by  experience  of 
the  hardest  kiiul,  after  a  loiifj;  series  of  ihe  bloodioKf  lessons. 

It  is  now  universally  conceded,  that  New  England  prejudicn-, 
violence,  enmity  and  even  baser  passions  occasioned  the  removal 
(tf  Sc-liuyler.  'I'liis  i^enei'al  was  always  unpojudar  with  the  New 
Eni:;hinders.  lb;  had  represcMited  his  native  state;  in  its  collision 
with  the  "  (irreen  Mountain  Jioys,"  in  the  controversy  concerninj^ 
the  "  New  Jlanipshire  (trants."  lie  had  with  indcunitable  will, 
nuuntained  the  rights  of  New  York,  and,  to  use  a  popular  ex- 
pression, till-  New  Kn<5landers  were  "  (hiwn  on  him"  for  it. 

In  this  connection  as  significant,  let  us  examine  into  the  com- 
])osition  of  the  forces  under  his  connnand. 

On  the  27th  July,  he  had  twenty-seven  hundred  Continental 
troops. 

Connecticut,  at  this  time,  was  represented  l»y  one  field  officer, 
even  (commissioned  officers,  six  warrant  officers,  one  drummer, 
six  si(rk,  three  rank  and  file,-  the  rest  deserted.  Fourteen  field, 
line  and  warrant  officers  to  three  effective  privates ! 

From  Berkshire  County,  Massachusetts,  about  two  hundred 
were  with  their  cohn-s,  and  in  Colonel  JVIoseby's  regiment,  hailing 
from  Hampshire  County,  ten  or  twelve  were  left. 

That  is  to  say.  New  England,  at  tliis  date,  was  represented  by 
two  hundred  and  thirty-four  men. 

New  York  had  a  thijusand  and  fifty  on  the  lIu<Ison,  besides 
tiiose  who  were  defeiuling  Fort  Stanwix,  ami  tiie  eight  hundred 
under  Ilarkheimer,  of  whom  about  one-half  perished  in  battle 
within  the  next  ten  days. 

Out  upon  the  pi-etentiousness  of  New  Englaiul.  They  have 
compiled  our  school-books,  and  they  have  wi'itten  our  histories. 
No  wonder  that  Fletcher  of  Saltoun  said,  ''  1  care  not  who  makes 
the  laws,  if  1  can  only  make  the  ballads  of  a  people." 

There  never  was  a  New  England  writer  just  to  the  State  of  New 
York,  from  the  first  one  wiio  took  up  a  pen,  down  to  the  eloquent 
historian  who  wound  up  by  finding  a  new  charge  against  New 
York's  great  son,  that  he   was  deficient  in  personal  intrepidity. 


20 


Sclmylor  settled  the  (jucHtion  at  the  time  by  a  Hiii^lc  scnteiiee: 
"ThescoundrelH  tliat  doubt  my  persoiuil  fortitude,  dare  not  j»ut  it 
to  the  trial." 

Such  meamiOBH  in  Hickeiiing,  but  it  in  excMisable,  perliaps,  in 
this  (!a80,  hiiicc  tjie  Hame  eharj^i  Iuih  j)ccii  brought  !i<^HitiKt  Krederie 
the  Great,  against  Napoleon,  agaiiiHt  Gre«'iie — in  fact,  against  the 
majority  of  the  best  generals,  who  liavo  failed  to  fulfil  the  absurd 
expectations  of  utter  ignoran<!e.  The  Karl  of  Cardigan,  after 
leading  the  Jialaelava  charge,  was  taunted  with  timidity  by  a 
London  cockney,  because  he  started  at  the  ex})losion  of  a  beer- 
bottle  in  a  railway  station. 

With  indignation  spurring  on  a  New  Yorker  and  a  Knicker- 
l)ockcr  to  vindicate  the  most  injured  num  of  the  Ilevolution,  it  \h 
very  difficult  to  put  a  curb  upon  the  produ(^tion  of  testimony. 

It  was  actually  the  19th  Sej)tember  before  liurgoyne  occupied 
his  most  southerly  head-(|uarters.  Freeman's  House,  distant  from 
Albany  about  twenty-five  miles  in  an  air-line.  Seventy-five  days 
had  elapsed  from  his  victorious  occupation  of  Ticondcroga  before 
he  stood  upon  the  ground  on  wluch  his  fate  was  to  be  decided. 
The  farthest  that  Schuyler's  troops  withdrew,  was  to  "Half- 
Moon,"  so  named  after  the  discoverer,  Henry  Hudson's  ship,  at 
the  junction  of  the  Mohawk  and  the  Hudson  rivers.  His  head- 
quarters were,  as  yet,  at  Stillwater,  in  advance  of  his  army. 
Thence  he  directed  all  the  movements  whicli  eventuated  in 
success ;  thence  it  was  that  he  made  the  effectual  appeal  to  Stark 
to  sacrifice  his  wounded  pride  and  outraged  feelings  for  the  sal- 
vation of  the  country  ;  thence  it  was  that  he  despatc^lied  Arnold 
to  the  relief  of  Fort  Stanwix ;  atid  there  it  was  when  Burgoyne, 
with  his  right  arm  amputated  on  the  Oriskany,  and  liis  left  on  the 
Wallopmscoick,  was  absolutely  bleeding  to  death,  and  ready  to 
die  of  exhaustion,  that  he  turned  over  the  conmumd  to  Gates. 

How  few  Americans  are  aware  that  in  answer  to  his  appeal 
to  Stark,  the  latter  had  replied  that  "he  would  take  no  orders 
from  any  officer  hi  the  Northern  Department,  saving  your  honor," 
Le.,  Schuyler. 

The  key  to'  the  grand  ultimate  American  success  at  Saratoga 
had  been  acquired  on  the  banks  of  the  Oriskany,  on  the  6th 
August,  in  the  same  way  that  the  fate  of  Mexico  was  actually 
determined  in  the  wild  pass  of  Buena  Vista  by  Taylor,  although 
it  required  a  series  of  victories  to  enable  the  main  army  under 
Scott  to  enter  the  capital  of  the  Aztec  Empire.  In  battles  be- 
tween nations  and  races,  as  in  combats  between  individuals,  it  is 


r 


\\ 


21 

not  alwHVH  the  lawt  Mow,  wn'cral  or  ovoii  rnntiy  of  tlio  la^t  hloWfl, 
tliiit  «U'<M(U' the  <inf>Htioii.  Otlic'i'wiHC  we  h1i(mi1»I  never  luivt!  IuuI 
the  proverb  of  "  The  tirft  hh>w  1h  Imlf  the  huttle."  This  whs 
im<h>iil)te(lly  the  ease  at  Koiiteiioy,  where  the  initiative  voUoy  of 
the  English  guards  did  hucIi  exeention,  as  to  nc^tnaliy  8tnn  or 
paralyze  the  French  infantry 'Heapahility  of  resiHtani^e.  Or  rather 
to  present  the  ease  in  a  simple  manner,  wlii(th  will  make  it  clear 
withont  reflection,  n  thrnnt  or  nhot,  by  wonnding  u  large  blood- 
vcHHol,  nuiy  deterrtiine  a  conflict,  althongh  the  wonnded  party 
shonld  be  abHoliitely  ignorant  of  the  injury  he  has  nnffered,  and 
(rontimu'H,  after  its  I'eceipt,  to  tight  on  long  and  bravely.  Again, 
prestige  h  2>on'ei\  and  the  viorale  of  the  Mexican  army  was  com- 
pletely shattered  at  Buena  Vista,  and  thus,  with  the  prestige  of 
the  Aztec  generals  and  of  their  old  troo])s  the  hope  of  nltimate 
success  may  almost  be  said  to  have  abandoned  their  camp  and 
their  standard. 

Considering  the  facta  and  results,  the  victory  of  Saratoga  is  a 
misnomer,  and  applied  to  it,  the  simile  of  a  wounded  blood- 
vessel is  most  appropriate.  The  destruction  of  linrgoyne  was  the 
result  of  a  succession  of  severe  wounds,  not  one  of  which  can  be 
attributed  with  justice  to  the  science  or  sagacity,  the  power  or 
patriotism  of  Gates.  The  deadly  blows  were  inflicted  by  Schuy- 
ler. One  of  his  weapons  was  Harkheimer  or  Herckheimor  at 
Oriskamj ;  the  other.  Stark,  at  Bennington.  As  Oriskany  is 
iirst  in  order  of  time,  there  is  much  to  justify,  according  to  Mr. 
Creasy's  method  of  deciding,  the  opinion  that  it  was  the  turning 
point  of  the  canij)aign,  and  of  the  utter  failure  of  the  British  at 
the  North. 

For  instance,  the  affair  of  Oriskany  took  place  August  6th, 
that  of  Bennington  August  l()th.  The  first  occurred  on  the  ex- 
treme right  wing,  by  which  Burgoyne  maintained  his  connection 
with  Upper  Canada.  The  second  was  on  the  extreme  left  of  the 
British  line  of  operations,  which  were,  so  to  speak,  "  in  air."  The 
tirst  battle  of  Stillwater  was  fought  Sept.  19  ;  the  second  at  the 
same  place,  Oct.  7th,  in  the  centre.  The  last  skirmish  was  the 
10th.  Every  one  of  these  last  three  were  checks,  rather  than 
triumphs.  Yet,  nevertheless,  the  four  together,  of  which  the  tirst 
two  constituted  the  points  on  which  the  campaign  turned,  certain- 
ly the  mere  turning  point,  occasioned  the  surrender  at  Saratoga 
on  the  17th  of  October.  Logistics  had  more  to  do  with  the 
accomplishment  of  this  important  result  than  Tactics,  or  even 
perhaps   than  Strategy.       Wliat  is   more,    the    hardest  logistic 


32 

blows  (if  we  may  presume  to  use  n  nonn  as  an  adjective)  were 
devised  and  delivered  l)y  Seluiyler,  long  before  Gates  assumed  the 
conunatid,  and  were  executed  anywlier"  hut  upon  tlie  field  where 
the  ignorant  masses  inuigine  that  the  hoasting  Anghj-Ainci'if'ati 
ii'athered  his  hiurels. 

One  incident  remains  to  be  rehited  whi(di  has  always  appeared 
to  the  speaker  as  the  finest  exemplification  of  Schuyler's  self- 
relian(re,  amid  such  distressing  difficulties,  moral  and  physical,  as 
surromided  him.  It  has  been  related  in  different  ways,  but  you 
shall  hear  it  as  it  was  first  represented  maiiy  years  ago  to  the 
individual  who  addresses  you. 

Schuyler  was  well  aware  of  th(!  importan(^e  of  Fort  Stanwix, 
and  although  apparently  he  could  not  spare  a  single  man,  he  des- 
j)atched  from  eight  hundred  to  one  thousand  men  to  save  it,  if 
still  it  could  be  saved;  to  redeem  it,  if  it  had  already  been  lost. 
Already  <!alumniated  as  a  a  traitor,  because  he  could  be  truly 
brave,  and  save  his  country  at  the  risk  of  his  own  individual  repu- 
tation, his  resolution  to  detach  Arnold  from  an  army  already  too 
feeble  to  face  Hm'goyne  in  the  field,  raised  a  new  storm  of  indig- 
nation against  a  patriot  as  true  as  Washington;  as  a  general, 
second  to  none  who  W(M'e  the  blue  and  buff". 

The  night  before  Learned  or  Arnold  started,  this  glorious 
tvpe  of  an  American  officrer  and  gentleman  was  heard  pacing  to 
and  fro  in  his  room,  with  feelings  lacerated  and  excited  by  the 
imputation  of  treason,  for  what  he  knew  was  a  master  stroke  of 
military  policy. 

''  I  will  do  it  "  !  lie  was  heard  to  exclaim,  more  than  once, 
with  the  strongest  affirmation  of  our  Saxon  vernacidar.  "  Let 
them  call  me  traitor  if  they  will."  Again  with  the  most  em])lia- 
\u'  oath,  he  added,  "  Arnold  shall  go"  I 

Arnold  marched  ;  and  on  receiving  the  lunvs  of  his:  a])proach, 
St.  Leger  br(>ke  up  the  siege  of  Fort  Stanwix,  aI)andoned  his 
artillery  and  stores  and  fled. 

"  Thus  was  Burgoyne's  right  arm  witliercd  (or  lopped  off  at 
Fort  Stanwix),  and  the  left,  which  he  had  stretched  (nearly)  as 
far  as  Hennington,  was  ari'ested  (or  amputated,  on  the  Iloosick, 
by  otu'  old  friend.  Stark,  of  l>uid<or  Hill  memory,  who  had  been 
roused  by  the  calls  of  General  Sc!iuyler." 

Benningtori  Avas  fought  and  won  on  the  Ifith  August,  three 
days  before  Gates  even  made  his  appearaiu-.e.  He  was  just  in 
time  however  to  receive  the  rejmrt  of  the  victory  and  transmit  it 
to  (Jougress  and  the  ])eople,  (/r^/'  his  signature  as  if  it  was  a  glory 
which  should  be  credited  to  him. 


? 


23 


V 


Arnold,  Sfluiylei''s  eho?en  lioutoiiant,  started  to  relieve  Fort 
Stamvix  on  the  J 3th  of  August,  hut  a  ])(»rtiou  of  the  same 
briirade,  Learned's,  from  wliicli  his  flviiii:*  column  had  been 
formed  by  volunteering,  liad  already  been  despatched  by  Schuy- 
ler in  that  direction.  The  mere  news  of  his  approa(;h  caused  St. 
Leger  to  break  up  the  siege,  and  abandoning  artillery  and  sup- 
plies, retreat  preiripitately.  Arnold's  sfai't  was  six  days  before  the 
arrival  of  Gates. 

Furthermore,  let  us  not  forget  that  St.  Leger  and  Sir  .John 
Johnson  luid  already  experienced  a  stunning  shock  at  the  hands 
of  Ilarkheimer,  on  the  Oriskany,  on  the  Cth  oi  August,  thirteen 
days  before  Gates  even  showed  liin^c^lf.  Gates  was  at  Stillwater, 
witliin  two  to  four  miles  of  the  invaders  of  his  adopted  country, 
which  entrusted  its  most  important  connnand  to  him',  on  tlie  19th 
of  August.     These  dates  are  repeated  for  emphasis. 

Gates  found  ready  to  his  hand  an  army,  cocks  in  their  om'U 
barn-yard,  of  thrice  the  effective  strengtli  of  the  enemy.  Never- 
theless, exactly  a  month  elapsed  before  there  M'as  any  battle,  and 
when  it  did  occur  the  aggressive  was  on  the  part  of  the  British. 
"  It  is  admitted  that  Gates  did  not  leave  his  camj)  during  the 
contest;  and  the  special  adjutant  referred  to,  (says  Lossing  in  his 
"  Field  Book  of  the  Revolution,"  ii.,  44),  asserted  boldly,  that 
intoxication  was  the  chief  cause.''  As  this  is  one  of  the  stereotyped 
(^barges  against  generals,  it  is  not  worth  while  to  dwell  upon  it ; 
])nt  it  appears  to  be  conceded,  that  not  only  Burgoyne  himself,  but 
three  of  his  Major-generals  were  prominently  upon  the  battle 
gi'omul,  and  under  the  most  spiteful  tire,  whereas  on  the  American 
side  not  one — not  even  a  Ih'igadier,  appeared  there  until  near  its 
(dose. 

[n  the  next  battle,  Stillwater,  7th  October,  Gates,  with 
at  least  two  if  not  three  Americans  to  one  Britisher,  did  not 
again  show  himself  to  the  ti'oops ;  neither  did  his  second  in  com- 
mand, Lincoln.  The  chief  glory  of  this  day  belongs  to  Arnold, 
who  had  no  legitimate  right  to  be  there,  and  a  goodly  share  to 
Morgan.  The  former  was  the  realizing  spirit  of  the  fighting,  and 
Morgan  did  his  duty  most  effectually.  Beth  these  were  children 
of  the  original,  bona  fide.  New  Netherland  domain. 

It  WHS  in  (;onse(j5ience  of  Morgan's  particular  personal  orders 
that  Fraser,  ]Jurgoyne's  best  lieutenant,  was  picked  oft'  and 
mortally  wounded;  and  there  is  very  little  doubt  that  Fraser's 
fall  was  the  princii)al  cause  of  the  American  victory.  What  is 
more,  as  a  farther  proof  of  the  tremendous  ett'(>ct  of  the  precision 


S 


24 


of  the  American  sharp-sliootei-H'  lire,  was  tlie  fatal  wounding  of 
Sir  Francis  Clarke,  Burgoyne's  first  or  chief  aide-de-camp,  at  the 
very  moment  when  he  was  conveying  a  most  important  order  to 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Kingston,  in  regard  to  tlie  disposition  of  the 
British  artillery. 

What  was  Gates  doing  at  tlie  crisis  of  this  battle — the  con- 
quering Gates — whose  fame,  based  on  Schuyler's  sacrilices, 
watchings  and  labors,  was  to  fill  the  whole  land  i  To  avoid  a 
charge  of  misrepresentation  the  speaker  will  (juote  in  reply  from 
the  noted  liistorian  Lossing,  who  introduces  this  statement  not 
only  into  his  "Field  Book  of  the  Revolution,"  but  repeats  it  in  liis 
biography  of  Schuyler.     (11,  369). 

"  Wlule  Arnold  was  wielding  the  fierce  sickle  of  war  without, 
and  reaping  golden  slieaves  for  Gates'  garnei-,  as  Schuyler  had 
intimated  that  he  was  likely  to  do,  the  commander  (according  to 
Wilkinson)  was  within  his  camp,  more  intent  upon  discussing  the 
merits  of  the  struggle  with  Sir  Francis  Clarke  (Burgoyne's  aide- 
de-camp,  who  had  been  wounded  and  taken  a  prisoner,  and  was 
lying  upon  Gates'  bed  at  headquarters),  than  upon  winning  a 
battle  which  was  all-important  to  the  ultimate  triumph  of  those 
principles  for  which  he  professed  so  warm  an  attachment.  When 
Wilkinson  came  to  him  from  the  battle-field  for  orders,  he  found 
Gates  very  angry  because  Sii*  Francis  would  not  allow  tlie  force 
of  his  argument.  lie  left  the  room,  and  calling  liis  aide  after  him, 
asked,  as  they  went  out:     '  Did  you  ever  hear  so  impudent  a  son 

of  a ? '     Poor  Sir  Francis  died  that  night  upon  the  bed  of 

his  coarse  and  vulgar  antagonist." 

The  last  fighting  or  skirmisliing  wliicli  occurred  ou  the  '.Uh, 
10th  Oct.,  was  lighted  up  by  the  flames  of  Schuyler's  devastated 
mansion;  l)arns,  mills,  store  houses,  granaries,  and  other  buihl- 
injrs  on  the  south  sliores  of  the  Fishkill,  such  as  to-day  would 
cost  $150,000.  A  few  weeks  previous,  Mrs.  Schuyler  had  burned 
lier  crops  to  prevent  them  from  profiting  the  enemy,  'in«l  now,  al- 
most the  last  act  of  the  invader  was  to  lay  her  happy  home  in  ashes. 

Burgoyne  had  now  become  convinced  that  his  army  could  no 
longer  tight,  maintain  itself,  retreat  in  a  body,  or  even  escape  in 
detachments.  The  Americans  would  not  hazard  an  engagement, 
although  they  were  from  ten  to  fifteen  thousand  strong  in  eiiec- 
tives,  and  the  British  had  only  three  thousand  five  hundred  figlit- 
ing  men  left.  Every  portion  of  Burgoyne's  position  could  be 
"  searched  out,"  not  only  with  artillery,  but  witli  small  arms, 
especially  rifles.     What  is  more,  every  American  who  had  even 


I 


V 


'V 


\^\ 


1  of 


I 


rms, 
'veii 


25 

a  fowling-piece,  luid  become  as  valuable  as  a  regular  soldier.  If 
he  could  not  b.and  up  like  a  professional  in  line  of  battle,  and 
augment  a  volley,  or  cross  bayonets,  he  could  bushwhack  like  a 
frontiersnum  or  an  Indian.  From  behind  a  tree,  a  practised 
stripling  might  pick  off  the  bravest  soldier  or  the  most  capable 
otttcer,  either,  a  nnu^h  larger  target  than  the  partridge  or  scpiii-rel 
lie  was  accustome<l  to  bring  down  with  a  single  ball.  These  were 
the  tactics  which  at  Kings  .Mountain,  7th  Oct.,  1780,  the  fiercest 
southern  conflict  of  the  whole  seven  years,  overwhelmed  the 
most  capable  and  intrepid  partisan  in  the  royal  service.  This 
decisive  engagement  is  remarkable  as  the  first  in  histoiy  in  which 
breech-loading  rifles,  with  elevating  sights,  were  used  as  weapons 
for  troops  "  of  the  line"  and  in  line.  The  Americans  could  not 
stand  the  British  bayonet,  which  scattered  them  like  sheep,  1)ut 
the  victors  in  the  charge  were  eventually  shot  down  like  wild 
beasts  in  a  l)attu.  If  there  is  an  accursed  trade  in  the  whole 
immense  circle  of  violence,  that  gives  "a  warrant  to  break  into 
the  bloody  house  of  life,"  to  which  man  readily  adapts  himself,  it 
is  that  of  a  sharpshooter.  Each  successful  shot  is  a  deliberate 
murder. 

If  Gates  had  possessed  any  of  the  foresigiit  and  insight  of  a 
general,  he  could  have  compelled  Burgoyne's  surrender  at  discre- 
tion. He  had  done  nothing  to  reduce  him  to  the  necessity,  and 
he  did  nothing  to  profit  by  the  necessity  to  which  he  had  been  re- 
duced by  Schuyler. 

When  Schuyler,  by  legal  inheritance,  became  possessed  of  a 
vast  fortune  for  the  time,  he  shared  it  with  his  brothers  and 
sisters.  Out  of  his  own  purse  he  relieved  the  necessities  of  his 
coimtry.  In  this  he  had  very  few  imitators.  Only  one  at  this 
])articular  juncture — Langdon  of  New  Hampshire.  Too  many  -l 
of  the  patriots  w^ere  rather  intent  on  filling  their  pockets.  As  a  ' 
recompense  for  his  own  patriotism,  an  Englisl  lan  was  allowed 
to  steal  his  birthright  and  Nev  Englanderc  enabled  him  to  do  so. 

Schuyler's  letters,  when  he  knew  that  he  was  to  be  superced- 
ed, read  almost  like  the  telegrams  of  Thomas  when  threatened 
with  supercedure  before  Nashville. 

Burgoyne  surrendered ! 

France  acknowledged  American  Independenc^e,  sent  us  troops, 
and  what  was  far  more  important,  money  and  supplies  of  all 
kinds.  Without  France,  freedom  would  not  have  been  achieved 
even  in  six  more  years,  if  at  all.  Little  gratitude  however,  is  due 
to  France  since  tlie  Colonies  were  simply  the  instruments  of  her 


26 


J-  vengeance  upon  Eiighuul.  Thim  the  capitiilsition  of  Siiratoga  was 
the  pass-key  to  American  victory. 

Scluiyler  forged  and  litted  the  key ;  inserted  it  in  the  lock  ; 
and  Gates  was  allowed  to  turn  it ;  Schuyler,  to  the  last,  forgetful 
of  self,  and  only  mindful  of  his  country,  assisting  Gates  to  open 
the  door. 

A  year  afterwards,  Congress  and  a  court-martial  exonerated 
Schuyler  from  all  blame,  and  within  three  years  ATE'S  sleepless 
sleuth-hounds  tore  Gates  down  from  his  place  of  pride,  and 
avenged  Schuyler.  Unfortunately  Ate  can  only  punish,  it  is  not 
her  prerogative  to  reward. 

The  speaker's  duty  to  his  native  State  and  to  his  Knicker- 
bocker l)lood  is  discharged,  but  New  York,  untrue  to  herself  in 
the  present  as  in  the  past — as  untrue  to-day  as  in  1777 — has  set 
up  no  monument,  either  to  Ilarkheinier,  mortally  wounded  in 
body  at  Oriskany  ;  or  to  Schuyler,  crucilied  in  spirit  at  Saratoga. 

Why?  Is  it  necessary  for  the  speal<^r  to  proclaim  it?  Be- 
cause Schuyler  was  not  an  intriguer  nor  a  politician,  a  speculator 
nor  a  peculator,  but  a  Christian  gentlenum  and  a  true  soldier. 

Schuyler  in  arms  never  served  again.  He  performed  his 
duty  to  the  letter  to  the  United  Stntes  and  to  New  York.  He 
inaugurated  the  system  M'hich  has  made  this  the  "  Empire  State," 
and  despite  the  liercest  life-long  tortures  of  disease  he  did  all  that 
any  man  could  do  to  serve  his  fellow  citizens  to  the  very  last.  He 
died  full  of  suffering,  afHiction,  years,  and  honors  conceded  too 
late,  on  the  18th  of  November,  1804,  realizing  "  Perfection  is  the 
greatest  fault  the  envious  man  can  discovei' — the  first  he  cannot 

reach,  the  last  he  cannot  injure." 

"Grave  precepts  fleeting  notions  may  impart, 
But  bri<>lit  exiimple  best  instruets  the  heart; 
Then  i<)oi<  on  Fabius,  let  his  coiidiiot  show, 
From  active  life  what  various  blessings  flow. 
In  him  a  just  ambition  stands  confessed; 
It  warms,  but  7wt  inflames  his  equal  lireast. 
See  him  in  senates  act  the  patriot's  part, 
Truth  on  his  lips,  the  public  at  his  heart, 
There  neither  fears  can  awe,  nor  hojies  control 
The  honest  purpose  of  his  steady  soul. 
No  mean  attacliments  e'er  seduced  his  tongue 
To  gild  the  cause  his  heart  suspected  wrong; 
But,  deaf  to  envy,  faction,  spleen,  his  voice 
Joins  here  or  there,  as  reason  guides  his  choice. 
To  one  great  point  his  faithful  labors  tend, 
'And  all  his  toil  in  '  Freedom's'  interest  end." 


